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Acknowledgement: The behavioral and neurosciences have made
remarkable progress in the past couple decades. Major advances have been
made in understanding a wide range of phenomena, from epigenetics and
neural plasticity to the nature of cognition, emotion, consciousness, moral
reasoning, social behavior, and culture. Indeed, so much has been learned
about human psychology recently that current explanations of many
psychological mechanisms and processes are markedly different from those
considered current just a generation ago.

At the same time that the scientific understanding of psychology
was surging forward, however, professional psychology (PP) went
through a particularly challenging period. There has always been
competition and divisiveness between the theoretical camps in the
field, but the seriousness of the conflicts increased in the 1990s. The
movement to establish empirically validated treatments was highly
contentious and the divisiveness surrounding recovered memories of
child sexual abuse was some of the most serious ever in the history of
psychology (Loftus & Davis, 2006). Many leading psychologists were
concerned that the conflicts and divisions had become so serious that
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the field might not be able to continue as a single discipline (e.g.,
Benjamin, 2001; Staats, 2005; Sternberg, 2005). The role of
psychologists, counselors, social workers, and other mental health
therapists in providing behavioral health care also declined from the
1990s to the 2000s while the proportion of clients with mental health
problems treated by psychiatrists and general medical practitioners
increased (Wang et al., 2006).
Professional psychology has made substantial progress in
working through several of these issues over the past decade.
Contemporary research tends to use stronger designs, measurements,
and statistical analyses than what were used in the past, and there is
less controversy regarding published research findings as a result.
Widespread consensus has also developed regarding the need to apply
evidence-based practice guidelines when providing behavioral health
care (American Psychological Association [APA] Presidential Task Force
on Evidence-Based Practice, 2006). These and other developments
have helped rein in issues that might have led to significant
controversy in the past, and several observers have noted that conflict
and divisiveness in the field have declined generally (e.g., Goodheart &
Carter, 2008).
Beyond these trends, there is also a more fundamental change
taking place. Recent research on human behavior has advanced so
significantly that the current scientific understanding of human
psychology is now fundamentally different from many of the standard
approaches PP traditionally used to understand human development,
functioning, and behavior change. For example, PP education has often
relied on an array of competing theoretical orientations for case
conceptualization and other important aspects of clinical training,
whereas these orientations are rarely mentioned in current scientific
explanations of human development and behavior (these issues are all
discussed more extensively in the next two sections). As a result, PP
needs to reconsider the standard frameworks and curriculum it uses
for education and training in the field. PP needs to keep current with
the underlying science, and outdated frameworks and practices need
to be identified and replaced based on the best scientific evidence
available.
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The main question addressed in this article concerns whether PP
needs to undergo a fundamental transition from the era when the
traditional theoretical orientations provided the main conceptual
foundations for clinical education and practice to an era based instead
on an integrated scientific understanding of human psychology. Such a
transition would be of historic importance for the field and would result
in major changes to PP education and practice. Evaluating whether
such a transition needs to take place, however, requires an
appreciation of the nature of theory and research in the field.
Therefore, this article begins with a brief historical review of theory
and research in psychology, so that the earlier approaches can be
contrasted with the current scientific understanding of human
psychology.

Professional Psychology in the Preparadigmatic
Era
A wide variety of theoretical approaches have been used to
understand human development, functioning, and behavior change
across the history of PP. Understanding the reasons for this diversity of
approaches is important for appreciating the evolution and current
status of the field.

The Proliferation of Theoretical Orientations
When psychology was becoming established as a scientific
discipline in the second half of the 19th century, there were two main
approaches to understanding mental phenomena. The first of these
was mental philosophy. The work of John Locke (1690), who proposed
the conceptualization of the mind as a tabula rasa, or blank slate, in
1690, was particularly influential. The second main approach involved
the experimental methods that emerged from the scientific revolution,
including the anatomical and physiological investigations that were
being conducted in biology and medicine (e.g., Hermann Helmholtz’s
1850 discovery of the speed of nerve conduction and Paul Broca’s
1861 discovery of a brain lesion in a man who had lost the ability to
speak; Benjamin, 2014). Fechner’s 1860Elements of Psychophysics
proved to be a watershed in convincing scientists that it was possible
to reliably measure psychological, and not just physiological,
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phenomena and that a science of psychology was consequently
possible.
Over the next century, a wide variety of alternative approaches
to understanding human psychology were proposed. Freud proposed
that it was actually subconscious processes, rather than the conscious
mental processes most psychology researchers focused on, that were
the important forces driving human psychology. John Watson then
argued that neither conscious nor subconscious phenomena were the
proper focus of psychology and should be replaced with a focus on
behavior. Starting in the 1950s, humanistic theories and, later,
cognitive and family systems approaches quickly grew in popularity. In
the 1970s, feminist and multicultural approaches became influential,
followed by solution-focused therapy, eye movement and
desensitization reprocessing, mindfulness-based approaches,
motivational interviewing, and others. Combining orientations in an
integrative or eclectic fashion also became common in the 1990s and
new theoretical systems continue to be proposed (e.g., Henrique,
2011; Magnavita & Anchin, 2014).
The problem of irreconcilable theoretical orientations for
understanding psychological phenomena was recognized right from the
start. The most influential critique came in 1913 from John Watson,
who pointed out that the existing theoretical orientations
fundamentally conflicted in ways that were not resolvable (Watson,
1913). Thomas Kuhn’s (1962) model of the evolution of scientific
disciplines is often used to explain this complicated situation. Kuhn
concluded that psychology was in a preparadigmatic stage of
development characterized by many conflicting views and competing
explanations for phenomena and disagreements about what is even
the proper focus of research. Kuhn argued that a field becomes
paradigmatic after the emergence of a major scientific achievement or
school of thought (i.e., a paradigm) that convincingly explains
phenomena and unites the scientific community in an area.
There are still many signs of preparadigmatic conflicts and
practices in contemporary PP. Divides between theoretical camps
remain serious (e.g., Shedler, 2010; Sternberg, 2005; Wampold et al.,
2010), and none of the theoretical orientations have come to dominate
PP or the larger behavioral health care field. Surveys of behavioral
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health professionals consistently find that only a minority, typically
less than one third of the sample, endorses a particular theoretical
orientation, even an eclectic or integrative approach (Prochaska &
Norcross, 2014). There have also been concerns that the use of some
theoretical orientations is potentially harmful. The use of unreliable
techniques or unsupported interpretations involving recovered
memories of child abuse resulted in numerous allegations of harm in
the 1990s (Loftus & Davis, 2006), and concerns have been raised
about several other orientations to clinical practice as well (Lilienfeld,
2007; Norcross, Koocher, & Garofalo, 2006).
Given the diversity of competing theoretical orientations in PP,
the standard approach for therapists to show that their clinical services
are competently delivered has been to select a theoretical orientation
and learn to apply it consistently in practice. This approach is still
evident in current educational practices in the field. For example, the
American Psychological Association (APA) Assessment of Competency
Benchmarks Work Group (Fouad et al., 2009) identified one of the
“essential components” of competent practice as follows: “Formulates
and conceptualizes cases and plan interventions utilizing at least one
consistent theoretical orientation” (p. S19). To apply to internships
listed by the Association of Psychology Postdoctoral and Internship
Centers (APPIC), students need to answer the following question on
the APPIC Application for Psychology Internship: “Please describe your
theoretical orientation and how this influences your approach to case
conceptualization and intervention” (APPIC, 2015).

Reasons for the Preparadigmatic Proliferation of
Theoretical Orientations
Though it may seem unusual that a diverse array of competing
theoretical orientations for understanding phenomena would develop
within a scientific discipline, there are very understandable reasons
why this happened in PP. Many of these reasons are generally well
known. In addition to the different personalities of the theorists and
the different historical and cultural contexts in which they worked are
issues more directly related to the nature of scientific theory and
research. Four issues are particularly important in this regard
(Melchert, 2015).
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First, many of the traditional theoretical orientations in the field
are based on philosophical assumptions or first principles (e.g.,
biologically based drives in Freudian theory, the blank slate of nearly
complete malleability in behaviorism, an optimistic self-actualizing
tendency in Rogerian theory, a postmodern constructivism in solutionfocused therapy). As a result, accepting the validity of these theories is
based largely on accepting their underlying assumptions. Indeed,
advice on selecting a theoretical orientation to guide one’s approach to
clinical practice frequently involves evaluating the fit between the
personal worldview of the therapist and the assumptions underlying a
theoretical orientation (e.g., Truscott, 2010).
A second reason for the preparadigmatic nature of psychology
involves the problem of nonfalsifiability, which was identified by the
philosopher of science Karl Popper. As a student in Vienna in 1919,
Popper heard both Freud and Einstein present their theories. Though
he was highly impressed with both of them, he observed that Freud’s
was presented in a way that made it amenable to confirmation,
whereas Einstein’s had testable implications that, if shown to be false,
would prove the entire theory wrong. Popper (1963) argued that
scientific theories must be falsifiable, and genuine tests of theories
involve attempts to refute them.
Another reason why the field remained preparadigmatic as long
as it did was the limited power and precision of the scientific tools that
were available to investigate the tremendous complexity of human
psychology. The power of scientific tools (e.g., telescopes and
microscopes) is well known to constrain the scope of the findings that
are possible in the natural sciences. The development of practical
functional magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and genomic sequencing
machines in the 1990s made it clear that progress in the neuro- and
behavioral sciences was also highly dependent on the power and
precision of scientific tools.
Another reason why the behavioral sciences remained
preparadigmatic as long as they did was the sheer complexity
involved. Scientists now routinely refer to the human mind and brain
as the most complex system known to exist in the universe. In just a
three-pound organ are 86 billion highly connected neurons, each with
an average of a thousand or more dendritic connections (Azevedo et
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al., 2009). Together they create feedback mechanisms across the
biological, psychological, and sociocultural levels that result in
structures and functions that also continually change and evolve. The
complexity involved in this system is truly extraordinary compared
with any other phenomenon known to exist, and uncovering and
explaining this tremendous complexity will naturally take longer than it
does to describe and explain most other natural phenomena. This is
ultimately the most important reason why psychology remained
preparadigmatic longer than the physical and biological sciences.

Emergence of the Behavioral Sciences as
Paradigmatic Disciplines
Despite the truly extraordinary complexity of human behavior,
research has advanced dramatically in recent years, and a new
scientific understanding of human psychology has emerged that is
fundamentally different from what existed previously. There are many
scientific advances that exemplify this new perspective, but two
developments have been critical in establishing the behavioral sciences
as paradigmatic disciplines that are now consistent with the rest of the
natural sciences. Without these developments, the behavioral sciences
likely would have not yet unified around a paradigmatic understanding
of human psychology. One of these developments is theoretical,
whereas the other is technical. The theoretical development links
psychology with the single greatest theoretical advance ever in
biology, namely, evolutionary theory.

Importance of Evolutionary Theory
The importance of evolution in human development was
recognized during the first century after Darwin (1859) published On
the Origin of Species in 1859, but it was generally not thought to play
a major role in higher level psychological characteristics because
humans are so different from other species and culture plays such an
important role in our mental life and behavior (Mameli, 2007).
Evolution was viewed as responsible for basic innate mental abilities
(e.g., sensation, perception, classical and operant conditioning, basic
logical and probabilistic reasoning), but our more sophisticated mental
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characteristics were viewed as categorically different from these lower
level capabilities. In recent decades, however, that view has changed.
Two major research achievements illustrate how evolutionary
theory has become essential for understanding the origins, structure,
and function of human psychology across all biopsychosocial levels of
natural organization. At the biological level, the very complicated and
peculiar structure of the human brain was poorly understood until Paul
MacLean (1967) applied an evolutionary perspective and identified
three basic structures: the “reptilian brain,” comprising the brain stem,
cerebellum, and basal ganglia that are very similar to reptile brains;
the “mammalian brain” that includes the limbic system, which is
prominent in mammals that live in social groups; and the most
recently evolved region of the mammalian brain, the cerebral cortex,
which is especially highly developed in humans. Subsequent research
found that MacLean’s original “triune brain” proposal was a
simplification that needed substantial refinement (Streidter, 2005), but
the highly complicated structure and function of the human brain
remained largely a mystery before the application of the evolutionary
perspective.
At the sociocultural level, prosocial behavior and altruism were
also largely a mystery until relatively recently. It seemed that selfish
and antisocial behavior would maximize the survival of individual
members of a species, and yet humans and other social animals
routinely also demonstrate highly prosocial behavior and even
altruism. In 1975, E. O. Wilson noted that this was the greatest
theoretical problem in all of sociobiology at that time (Wilson, 1975).
The solution to this problem involved changing the focus of
evolutionary theory from the reproducing individual to the replicating
gene—organisms engage in behavior that promotes survival and
replication of the gene, not necessarily the individual organism that
carries the gene (Dawkins, 1976). This insight was critical for
understanding the competing nature of individual and group selection
that favors both selfishness (individual selection) and cooperation
(group selection). These competing evolutionary pressures are also the
source of many conflicted human emotions and cognitions (anger,
competition, tribalism, curiosity, humility, empathy, love) that are at
the very core of human psychology (Buss, 2015; Dunbar & Barrett,
2007; Wilson, 2014). Recent investigations into these types of
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questions are resulting in dramatic reconceptualizations of the major
role of culture in the evolution of human social behavior (e.g., Morris,
2014; Pinker, 2011).
Many more examples could be presented that show how
essential features of human nature are unintelligible without
evolutionary theory (for reviews, see Buss, 2015; Dunbar & Barrett,
2007). At both the level of mechanisms (“proximate explanations of
behavior”) and the level of “ultimate explanations of behavior,” or why
life is designed in the manner it is (Tinbergen, 1963), human
psychology cannot be understood from a scientific perspective without
evolutionary theory. This is true from the level of neuroanatomy and
physiology (e.g., MacLean, 1967), to infant attachment (e.g., Bowlby,
1969), to cognition and consciousness (e.g., Gazzaniga, 2011), to
intimate and family relationships (e.g., Fisher, 2004), to interpersonal
relations and social behavior (e.g., Pinker, 2011). The biologist
Theodosius Dobzhansky (1973, p. 125) noted that “nothing in biology
makes sense except in the light of evolution,” and it is now apparent
that the same observation applies to human psychology as well. The
behavioral sciences are now fundamentally linked at the theoretical
level with the rest of the natural sciences in terms of both proximate
and ultimate explanations (Buss, 2015). This is a historic development
that, for the first time, unifies psychology around a paradigmatic
theoretical perspective that is consistent with the rest of the natural
sciences. This perspective may not yet be well integrated into PP
education and practice, but it is fully accepted across the behavioral
sciences generally as well as the biological and neurosciences (see
Buss, 2015; Dunbar & Barrett, 2007).

Importance of More Powerful Scientific Tools
A second critical development for establishing the neuro- and
behavioral sciences as paradigmatic scientific disciplines has been the
invention and use of more powerful and precise scientific tools that
have allowed experimental tests of hypotheses that had to remain
speculations in the past (Wood et al., 2006). These include both
conceptual tools (e.g., new statistical procedures) as well as technical
tools (e.g., genetic sequencing machines). For example, the genetic
sequencing of individuals’ genomes from around the world has found
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that all human beings now alive descended from the same parents (a
common mother who lived about 200,000 years ago and a common
father who lived about 142,000 years ago; Stringer, 2012). This and
related research has overturned common misperceptions about the
biological meaning of race (Omi, 2001).
Probably the most revolutionary technology that has propelled
recent advances in understanding the human mind and brain was the
invention of imaging machines, particularly the development of
practical functional MRI (fMRI) in the 1990s. Newer imaging machines
such as diffusion tensor MRI and magnetoencephalography are further
improving both the spatial and temporal resolution of images of brain
function. These new technologies are allowing increasingly precise
observations of brain functioning at both micro and macro levels, and
these are leading to dramatic advances in understanding a variety of
psychological processes. For example, the brain has been found to be
far more plastic than what was commonly believed just two decades
ago (Davidson & Begley, 2012). Consciousness has also been found to
arise from the interplay of a wide variety of neural structures, many
that operate subconsciously, and the finding that the brain makes
some decisions before the mind becomes consciously aware of them
has raised challenging questions regarding the nature of responsibility
and free will (e.g., Gazzaniga, 2011). When Freud and others proposed
similar ideas in the past, the scientific tools required to rigorously test
them were unavailable. That limitation has now been surpassed and
knowledge of human psychology is surging ahead as a result.
Though research in many areas is still in its early stages, the
tremendous complexity of human psychology is steadily being
uncovered. Of course, it will take decades of additional research to
explain the precise nature and function of many psychological
mechanisms and processes, and disagreements naturally exist
regarding findings that have not yet been well replicated and tested,
as is the case in any scientific discipline. It is also difficult to gain an
integrated understanding of the existing research because the
literature is fragmented as a result of the many specializations
involved. Nonetheless, there is no major disagreement regarding the
main findings that were mentioned earlier in this section with regard to
the importance of evolutionary theory and more powerful scientific
tools. Despite all that remains to be discovered, the behavioral and
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neurosciences have advanced dramatically and a unified paradigmatic
understanding of human psychology has emerged that is consistent
with theory and research across the natural sciences (APA Presidential
Task Force, 2010). Psychology is no longer a preparadigmatic
academic discipline, but has become one of the paradigmatic natural
sciences.

Emergence of PP as a Unified Clinical Science
The recent transition of the behavioral sciences to a unified
paradigmatic approach to understanding human psychology compels
PP to reexamine its curriculum and clinical frameworks and guidelines
so that any aspects that have become outmoded can be updated or
replaced. Professional psychologists would all agree that PP is a
science-based profession that needs to keep current with scientific
advances and update educational and clinical practices that are no
longer supported by the best available scientific evidence.
Identifying changes that are needed at this point for PP to keep
current with scientific advances will require extensive discussion.
Central among the topics that need to be addressed is the theoretical
basis for clinical practice. The theoretical foundations underlying PP
have been unclear throughout the history of the field, and there has
been no consensus regarding the appropriate theoretical orientation or
framework that should be applied to inform clinical practice. This
problem now appears to have been effectively resolved, however, by
the underlying science having reached a unified paradigmatic
understanding of human psychology. To facilitate discussion on this
and related topics, the following issues are suggested as implications
of the current scientific understanding of human psychology that PP
could consider for possible integration into education and practice in
the field.

A Single, Unified Theoretical Orientation
For the first time in the history of PP, the preparadigmatic array
of conflicting theoretical orientations in the field can now be replaced
with a unified paradigmatic scientific understanding of human
psychology. If PP embraces this position, it will precipitate the
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reexamination of several long-standing practices within the profession.
For example, ever since clinical and counseling psychology became
established as professions shortly after World War II, training
programs have been given great latitude to decide their curriculum,
because there was no consensus regarding a core curriculum or
theoretical orientation that students entering the profession should
master. This was specifically acknowledged at the 1949 Boulder
Conference, where the conferees agreed that there should be a
common core but also that there was not “one best way” (Raimy,
1950, p. 55), and they recommended that the issue be left to
universities to decide. This perspective is still reflected in the current
APA Commission on Accreditation (2013) Guidelines and Principles of
Accreditation, which state that
the accreditation guidelines and principles are specifically
intended to allow a program broad latitude in defining its
philosophy or model of training and to determine its training
principles, goals, objectives, designed outcomes, (i.e., its
“mission”), and methods to be consistent with these. Stated
differently, the Commission on Accreditation recognizes that
there is no one “correct” philosophy, model, or method of
doctoral training for PP practice; rather there are multiple valid
ones. (p. 4)
The current scientific understanding of human psychology
suggests a very different approach. From a paradigmatic scientific
perspective, one does not select from an array of competing
theoretical orientations or philosophies for understanding natural
phenomena. Once falsifiable theories are sufficiently tested and
verified using experimental research methods, then preparadigmatic
orientations for understanding those phenomena are replaced (e.g.,
once the germ theory of disease was demonstrated by Pasteur in the
second half of the 19th century, miasma [“bad air”] theory and the
Hippocratic humoral theory of disease were discarded). Replacing the
preparadigmatic theoretical orientations in PP with an integrated,
scientific understanding of human behavior is critical for the field to be
practiced as a clinical science that is unified around a scientific
approach to understanding human psychology and behavioral health
care.
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The broad outlines of the current scientific understanding of
human psychology are now evident. A very large body of replicated
and well controlled research has examined a wide range of
psychological processes from micro to macro levels, from epigenetics
and neural plasticity to infant attachment, to the nature of
consciousness and moral reasoning, to the impacts of social context
and culture. These findings have also been integrated into falsifiable
higher level theoretical frameworks that are capturing the complexity
of human development and behavior in an increasingly comprehensive
manner (e.g., Davidson & Begley, 2012; Fisher, 2004; Gazzaniga,
2011; Greene, 2013; Morris, 2014; Pinker, 2011; Ramachandran,
2011; Sroufe, Egeland, Carlson, & Collins, 2005; Wilson, 2014).
Though these frameworks cannot be discussed in detail here, it is
critical to note that they all are based on the observation that human
cognition, emotion, and behavior are dependent on underlying
biological structures and processes that interact with psychological and
behavioral factors, and that these in turn interact with social and
cultural factors. Knowledge of the inextricably intertwined
biopsychosocial domains of functioning is simply necessary to the
scientific understanding of human development and functioning (e.g.,
Engel, 1977; Melchert, 2015; Wilson, 2014). This is true from the level
of neurons (e.g., neural plasticity; Davidson & Begley, 2012) to the
level of the individual organism (e.g., the nature of consciousness;
Gazzaniga, 2011) to the level of relationships (e.g., romantic love and
parenting; Fisher, 2004) to the level of culture and society (e.g., the
dramatically different ways that humans treat each other in modern
society compared with previous eras; Pinker, 2011). It is also
noteworthy how small a role the traditional theoretical orientations
play in current scientific explanations of these various processes.
The current scientific understanding of human psychology is
tremendously complex, but there is now overwhelming evidence
supporting this perspective. As a science-based profession, PP needs
to incorporate this literature into PP education and practice. There is
not one correct starting point or sequence for learning this literature.
One could start with the sociocultural level of natural organization,
particularly because this level has had such a large impact on the
recent evolution of biopsychosocial functioning and behavior. The
psychological level is often covered relatively thoroughly in PP
programs because of the field’s traditional emphasis on cognition,
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emotion, and behavior at the level of the individual. The biological
level is often covered less well, particularly in terms of proximate and
ultimate explanations of behavior. Figuring out how best to
systematically cover these three interacting levels in PP education will
require significant exploration, but moving forward with implementing
this approach could be relatively straightforward. For example, a
future version of the APA Commission on Accreditation Guidelines and
Principles of Accreditation might allow broad latitude in the educational
methods used by training programs (e.g., online and traditional
courses), but require that the training principles, goals, and designed
outcomes be oriented around the scientific understanding of human
psychology—that is, there will be “one ‘correct’ philosophy of doctoral
training for PP practice” (borrowing language from the current
guidelines; APA Commission on Accreditation, 2013, p. 4). A future
version of the APA Competency Benchmarks might likewise include a
standard that would read: “Assesses and evaluates cases and plans
interventions based on the scientific understanding of human
development, functioning, and behavior change.”

Reconciling the Unified Scientific Basis of Psychology
with the Many Psychotherapies Available
For many professional psychologists, the most difficult aspect of
the transition to a unified scientific approach to understanding
behavioral health care may involve the loss of the traditional
theoretical orientations as the basis for conceptualizing clinical cases.
In the preparadigmatic era of PP, one’s personally adopted theoretical
orientation played a major role in informing one’s understanding of the
whole treatment process from the initial conceptualization of the
nature and etiology of clients’ problems at assessment, to the
treatment plan one recommended, the treatment one provided, and
how one evaluated outcomes and effectiveness at the end of
treatment. This is still usually considered the standard approach for
learning the profession (e.g., as reflected in the APA Competency
Benchmarks [Fouad et al., 2009] and the APPIC Application for
Psychology Internship [APPIC, 2015]).
Replacing the traditional theoretical orientations with a unified
scientific understanding of human psychology would not mean,
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however, that the traditional orientations play no role in behavioral
health care. Though these orientations may not provide valid
explanations of the mechanisms responsible for behavior change (e.g.,
even cognitive therapy, one of the most popular of the theoretical
orientations, is inadequate for that purpose; Kazdin, 2007), and they
clearly do not provide comprehensive explanations of human
psychology, they are still very useful. And they will continue to play an
essential role in behavioral health care because they describe
psychotherapies that have been empirically demonstrated to be safe
and effective for achieving behavior change (e.g., APA, 2012). They
would not be referred to as theoretical orientations because they do
not refer to theories in the falsifiable, scientific sense of the term. They
are appropriately referred to as psychotherapies, however, that is, as
systems of methods and processes that result in therapeutic
improvements in large numbers of cases when applied appropriately.
In other words, these therapies might still be found to be effective for
ameliorating distress and improving functioning even if their original
theoretical formulations are no longer supported as proximate or
ultimate scientific explanations of human psychology. Most
psychotherapies were developed before recent scientific research
uncovered the mechanisms, functions, and origins of many
psychological processes, and so it would not be surprising if their
preparadigmatic theoretical underpinnings are not always supported
by current scientific knowledge.
The scientific foundations of behavioral health care consequently
rely on the now-well-established scientific literature that explains
human development and functioning as well as the extensive research
that has demonstrated the safety and effectiveness of a variety of
therapeutic interventions. Knowledge of both these topics is clearly far
from complete, however, and particularly regarding the specific
mechanisms and processes that result in psychiatric syndromes or that
explain therapeutic improvements. To deal with this situation, PP has
embraced the principles of evidence-based practice whereby
practitioners consider the best available research evidence relevant to
a case and integrate that with their clinical experience as well as
clients’ preferences, values, and culture (APA Presidential Task Force
on Evidence-Based Practice, 2006).
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It is important to note that medicine relies on the same
evidence-based practice principles as PP because it operates in the
same context of incomplete knowledge regarding health, dysfunction,
and disease. Medical science has also made dramatic progress, but
there is still limited knowledge regarding the cause and cure of many
medical conditions (e.g., idiopathic diseases such as Alzheimer’s,
Parkinson’s, Type I diabetes, multiple sclerosis, many cancers, many
seizures, and pain syndromes). As a result, ameliorating symptoms
caused by these conditions often becomes the treatment goal. Even
for diseases that are better understood, existing knowledge may be
insufficient to indicate specific treatments. Take, for example, heart
disease. Several medications are available to treat heart disease (e.g.,
anticoagulants, beta blockers, diuretics, statins) as well as a variety of
surgeries (e.g., angioplasty, bypasses, stents) and implantable devices
(e.g., pacemakers, defibrillators). Behavioral changes are often
prescribed as well (e.g., healthy diet, exercise, stress management,
smoking and alcohol use reduction). Predicting patients’ response to
treatment can be very imprecise and consequently a stepped approach
is often used where less intensive, invasive, and risky treatments are
tried first (Bonow, Mann, Zipes, & Libby, 2012). Physicians should not
base their evaluation and treatment recommendations on the dictates
of a personally selected theoretical orientation but instead on the best
available scientific knowledge, their prior experience, and patient
values (Institute of Medicine, 2001). Despite incomplete knowledge
regarding the etiology and treatment of many diseases, medicine
nonetheless relies on a single, unified scientific approach to
understand health and disease while employing a range of
interventions that have been tested for safety and effectiveness. As
clinical sciences based ultimately on the same incomplete body of
scientific knowledge regarding human biopsychosocial functioning,
medicine and PP both now use the same evidence-based approach to
maximize the benefits and minimize the risks of health care
intervention.

New Training Approaches and Resources
Transitioning to a paradigmatic scientific approach also raises
questions about changes that may be needed in PP education to
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based practice principles. Many psychologists have considered aspects
of these questions in detail, but broader discussions (e.g., within our
professional organizations) may be needed to evaluate whether
systematic changes are necessary to ensure that the field as a whole
remains current in terms of education, practice, and research. A
possible starting point for these discussions would be to revisit the
question of the need for a core curriculum in the field and what it
would look like if PP is approached as a unified clinical science
(Benjamin, 2001). A useful way to begin this discussion would be to
review the historical development of psychology from a
preparadigmatic to a paradigmatic science that now has theoretical
and empirical foundations that are consistent with the rest of the
natural sciences. This could be followed by an examination of the
implications of that transition for practicing PP as a unified clinical
science (e.g., along the lines suggested by the present discussion).
Discussions will also be needed regarding the appropriate
breadth and depth of curricular coverage regarding the interacting
biological, psychological, and sociocultural influences on development
and behavior. A variety of clinical topics would also need to be
examined. For example, as a clinical science, it may be important to
give more systematic attention to the epidemiology of behavioral
health disorders, the interactions between behavioral and physical
health and sociocultural factors, the most effective interventions for
addressing different types of behavioral health problems, the
prevention of behavioral health and other biopsychosocial problems,
and the promotion of biopsychosocial health and functioning (Melchert,
2015). Discussions will likely also focus on the range of skills one
should possess to conduct assessment, psychotherapy, and other
behavioral health interventions in different types of general and
specialized practice settings. The range of skills in research design,
measurement, and data analysis that are needed to evaluate research
and carry out one’s clinical responsibilities also needs to be discussed.
New training resources (e.g., textbooks, competency assessments) will
need to be prepared, new training models might be considered, and
accreditation criteria and licensure standards may need to be updated,
as will continuing education programming. These new educational
resources and curricula will be especially important for training in
integrated primary care (see the section titled Integrated Primary
Care). A variety of stakeholder groups would likely be interested in
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examining aspects of these questions that most directly pertain to
them (e.g., graduate and internship training programs, health service
provider groups, professional societies, accreditation and certification
bodies), but it would also be important that these groups communicate
with each other to ensure that important considerations are not
missed.
The previous section noted the importance of evidence-based
practice principles in health care generally. The importance of these
principles in PP education specifically is exemplified by one of the most
important documents in the field, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders (DSM), a system that is based on limited scientific
knowledge but still has significant clinical utility. The third edition of
the DSM (American Psychiatric Association, 1980) was developed out
of dissatisfaction with the low diagnostic reliability of the earlier
editions. It relied on a descriptive, atheoretical approach that
emphasized clinician interrater reliability while setting aside questions
of etiology, and disorders were included based on voting by
committees. Many changes were incorporated into the latest (fifth)
edition of the DSM (DSM–5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013),
but it, too, relies on the same general approach as earlier editions.
Well-known problems with this approach are excessive comorbidity,
the proliferation of hundreds of putatively different pathological
entities, and the lack of knowledge regarding the biology underlying
the pathological syndromes (Cuthbert & Kozak, 2013). The science of
psychopathology, however, has not yet advanced far enough to
indicate an alternative approach. The National Institute of Mental
Health was well aware of these problems when it launched the
Research Domain Criteria project in 2008 to research relationships
between dysfunctional behavior and neurobiological systems. Because
that and other research has not yet advanced sufficiently, the DSM–5
is widely regarded as the best available classification of mental
disorders, despite its limited scientific foundations (Insel & Lieberman,
2013). Appreciating these issues is critical when PP is approached as a
clinical science that relies on the principles of evidence-based practice.
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More Clinical Perspective on Treatment Effectiveness
The voluminous literature that has accumulated in recent
decades regarding the effectiveness of behavioral health care
intervention has greatly strengthened the scientific foundations of PP.
The general effectiveness of psychotherapy was unclear until Smith
and Glass (1977) conducted meta-analyses that compellingly
demonstrated that psychotherapy was effective, even “remarkably
efficacious” (Wampold, 2001, p. 71). Research further suggests that
the effectiveness of psychotherapy often exceeds or is comparable
with that of alternative psychopharmacological interventions (APA,
2012). There are still vigorous debates regarding the biopsychosocial
mechanisms and processes responsible for behavior change (e.g., the
role of common factors vs. specific treatment effects; Wampold et al.,
2010). This is not unexpected, however, given that psychological
outcomes are multifactorially determined and the process by which
individuals change is likely to be complicated as well. But there is no
longer significant debate regarding the general effectiveness of
psychotherapy.
One consequence of having established the general
effectiveness of psychotherapy is likely to be greater attention on
objectively evaluating the effectiveness of treatment in the individual
case. Currently there is substantial emphasis on using empirically
supported treatments as part of evidence-based practice, but
additionally monitoring and demonstrating the effectiveness of
treatment using standardized outcome measures is likely to grow in
emphasis as well. This practice is also important for identifying cases
that include deterioration so that treatment can be adjusted to attempt
a more beneficial outcome (Barlow, 2010; Lambert, 2010). Examples
from medicine are again useful to illustrate the importance of this
approach. For many medical conditions, standard practice includes the
use of objective outcome measures, and it would be considered
entirely inadequate to employ an empirically supported treatment
without also systematically monitoring the effects of that treatment on
an ongoing basis (e.g., routine blood pressure or blood sugar
measurements to monitor the effectiveness of hypertension or
diabetes treatment). Of course, many problems and illnesses are not
reversed or cured (as is the case in behavioral health care as well).
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Nonetheless, treatments are typically monitored on an ongoing
individual basis, modified as needed to maximize effectiveness and
minimize risks, and continuing care for chronic conditions can extend
for many years. As PP orients more clearly as a clinical science, further
movement in this direction is likely as well.

Integrated Primary Care
Integrated primary care is currently being advocated in the
United States and worldwide to improve the effectiveness and
efficiency of health care delivery systems, for those with serious
physical and mental illness as well as the population in general (e.g.,
Belar, 2012; Miller & Prewitt, 2012; World Health Organization, 2008).
Patient-centered medical homes and other integrated primary care
models are designed to take more holistic, biopsychosocial approaches
to the assessment and treatment of physical and mental illness and
disease (Nielsen, Langner, Zema, Hacker, & Grundy, 2012).
There is also growing recognition within medicine of the
importance of behavior in the etiology, consequences, and treatment
of physical health problems. Indeed, it is estimated that fully 50% of
morbidity and mortality in the United States is caused by behavior and
lifestyle factors (Institute of Medicine, 2004). As a result, assessment
and treatment in integrated primary care is biopsychosocial in
orientation because of the clear interactions between medical,
psychological, and sociocultural influences on health and functioning.
Utilizing one or some combination of the traditional theoretical
orientations to psychological practice can be very difficult or even
impossible in these settings; instead, a science-based biopsychosocial
approach is necessary (Health Service Psychology Education
Collaborative, 2013; Melchert, 2015). If PP does not fill the need for
behavioral health expertise in integrated primary care, other
professions will.

Conclusions
Remarkable progress has been made in the scientific
understanding of human psychology. Though many psychological
phenomena remain only poorly understood at this point, increasingly
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detailed explanations of numerous aspects of human development and
functioning are steadily accumulating. Psychology is now firmly
grounded in experimental findings and tests of falsifiable theories that
are thoroughly consistent with the rest of the natural sciences. The
speed at which this has occurred has also been remarkable. Indeed,
many aspects of the current scientific understanding of human
psychology had not yet been discovered just a generation ago.
Textbooks from that time typically relied on the traditional theoretical
orientations to explain many features of personality, psychopathology,
and psychotherapy. Many textbooks in PP still take that approach.
Textbooks in the future, however, will undoubtedly have completely
different starting points for discussing these topics. They will likely
note the historical importance of the traditional theoretical
orientations, but will then proceed to discuss the increasingly well
established proximate and ultimate scientific explanations of human
behavior.
The evolution of psychology to a paradigmatic natural science
discipline poses critical questions for PP as well. As a science-based
profession, PP needs to identify outmoded frameworks and practices
and replace them with approaches consistent with the best available
scientific knowledge. Before recent years, there essentially was no
alternative but to rely on the various theoretical orientations for
guiding clinical practice, because scientific knowledge regarding the
tremendous complexity of human psychology was too limited. Now
that a paradigmatic scientific understanding has emerged, however, it
might be considered irresponsible for PP not to systematically
transition to the new scientific framework. Some might be inclined to
propose still another theoretical orientation to attempt to capture the
expansive and integrative biopsychosocial nature of human behavior,
but that would not be a scientific approach. Science is cumulative,
building on verified observations and experimental tests of falsifiable
theories that explain how natural phenomena are structured and
organized and why they function the way they do. New theoretical
orientations in PP generally have not been designed to explain
phenomena in this manner, but instead typically offer alternative
explanations of phenomena based on the proponent’s experience and
worldview. The regular introduction of new theoretical orientations was
a main feature of the preparadigmatic era in psychology, but that era
has come to an end.
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Though difficult in some ways, transitioning to a unified sciencebased approach to education and practice in the field will be a very
welcome development for many psychologists. This has always been,
after all, the goal of the profession from the start. It would also mean
that many of the perennial preparadigmatic conflicts between the
theoretical camps in the field can finally be left behind. More
importantly, it would mean that PP would become a true clinical
science guided by an integrated body of scientific knowledge that is
consistent with the rest of the scientific disciplines and clinical
professions. Moving ahead with a unified voice grounded firmly in
science will allow PP to more effectively address people’s behavioral
health and biopsychosocial needs. This is critical not just for the future
of the profession but also for the health and well-being of the public
who we serve.

Footnotes
1

2

George Engel introduced the “biopsychosocial model” in 1977 to counter
what he viewed as the overemphasis on biology in medicine. His
perspective has been highly influential throughout healthcare and is
widely regarded as the appropriate framework through which to
understand health and healthcare. It has also been pointed out that he
misnamed his approach, however, because he did not propose a model
in the scientific sense (i.e., that utilizes observations, rules, and
scientific laws to explain a class of phenomena) but instead used the
term in its colloquial sense (e.g., McLaren, 1998). Engel’s approach
technically refers to a metatheoretical framework that points to the
range of factors that need to be considered to understand theory and
research in medicine (Melchert, 2015). It takes the same general
approach as various integrative and eclectic approaches that have
been introduced in PP and point to the range of factors that need to be
considered to understand human psychology (e.g., Lazarus’s, 1976,
BASIC-ID framework). But it does not refer to a falsifiable scientific
model or theory that explains particular phenomena.
The APA Commission on Accreditation has required that accredited PP
training programs address the biological, cognitive and affective, and
social bases of behavior since the late 1970s. Programs were given
significant latitude in choosing how to cover those topics, however,
because though it was obvious that biological, cognitive and affective,
and social factors had major influences on behavior, an integrated
biopsychosocial understanding that was consistent with the rest of the
natural sciences (as described earlier) has only recently emerged. In
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addition, clinical case conceptualization and intervention typically have
been based on one’s chosen theoretical orientation and not on an
integrated understanding of the biopsychosocial basis of behavior. This
led to many conflicting perspectives, several of which became highly
controversial (e.g., regarding repressed memories of child sexual
abuse).
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